Black Snake on the Periphery: The Dakota Access Pipeline and Tribal Jurisdictional Sovereignty by Rome, Andrew
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 93 Number 1 Article 2 
1-1-2018 
Black Snake on the Periphery: The Dakota Access Pipeline and 
Tribal Jurisdictional Sovereignty 
Andrew Rome 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rome, Andrew (2018) "Black Snake on the Periphery: The Dakota Access Pipeline and Tribal Jurisdictional 
Sovereignty," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 93 : No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol93/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
         
 
 BLACK SNAKE ON THE PERIPHERY: THE DAKOTA ACCESS 
PIPELINE AND TRIBAL JURISDICTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
ANDREW ROME* 
ABSTRACT 
 
“[W]hen one strips away the convoluted statutes, the technical legal 
complexities, the elaborate collateral proceedings, and the layers upon lay-
ers of interrelated orders and opinions from this Court . . . what remains is 
the raw, shocking, humiliating truth at the bottom: After all of these years, 
our government still treats Native American Indians as if they were some-
how less than deserving of the respect that should be afforded to everyone 
in a society where all people are supposed to be equal.”1		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*† JD Vermont Law School.  Thank you to Morgan, Harper, and Warren.  A big thank you 
to Professor Hillary Hoffmann for taking the time to meet with me and formulate this Article, and 
for providing feedback on the initial draft.  And thank you to the editorial staff of the NORTH 
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.   
1. Cobell v. Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Lakota2 had prophesied this:  a great and evil black snake would 
someday descend and reap destruction, rendering their homeland uninhabit-
able to hunt and fish and their waters unsuitable for religious ceremony.3  
The black snake would disrupt the Lakota’s sacred connection to their 
land.4  
Now that prophesy may become a reality in the form of the Dakota Ac-
cess Pipeline (“DAPL”), operated by Dakota Access, LLC (a subsidiary of 
Energy Transfer Crude Oil Company, LLC).5  If allowed to proceed, the 
 
2. Lakota Indians, INDIANS.ORG, (last visited May 8, 2017), 
http://www.indians.org/articles/lakota-indians.html. The term “Lakota” refers to the cluster of 
tribes—including the Standing Rock Sioux and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes—located in North 
and South Dakota. This Article focuses on the rights of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, a federally 
recognized tribe and a direct lineage of the Great Sioux Nation. Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F.Supp.3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:16–cv–1534–
JEB), [hereinafter Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment].  
3. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F.Supp.3d at 82.  
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
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DAPL will span roughly 1100 miles from North Dakota to Illinois,6 and 
will transport approximately half-a-million barrels of crude oil per day.7  As 
currently planned, it will cross the bed of Lake Oahe, a portion of the Mis-
souri River a half-mile upstream from the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Res-
ervation in North Dakota.8  The DAPL has, unsurprisingly, sparked outrage 
from both the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the international human 
rights community.  A protest site at the Cannonball River in North Dakota 
became emblematic of this resistance.9   
In July 2016, as part of the effort to block or re-route the DAPL, the 
Standing Rock and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes brought an action in 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.10  This ongo-
ing suit attempts to enjoin the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) from 
granting the DAPL an easement to cross Lake Oahe.11  The Tribes allege 
the Lake Oahe crossing will result in treaty rights violations, religious in-
fringement, and environmental degradation in violation of the National His-
toric Preservation Act (NHPA); the Clean Water Act (CWA); and the Na-
tional Environmental Preservation Act (NEPA).12  In addition, the Tribes 
brought a later claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
 
6. Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, United States Dep’t of the Interior, to 
Sec’y, United States Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 4, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter M-
Opinion].  
7. Gabrielle Regney & Hillary Hoffmann, Vermont Law Top 10 Environmental Watch List 
2017: Dakota Access Pipeline: The Calm Between the Storms, VT. J. ENVTL. L., 
http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/topten/dakota-access-pipeline-calm-storms/ (last visited May 5, 2017). 
8. M-Opinion, (Dec. 4, 2016) (on file with author). In addition, the DAPL will cross seventy 
miles upstream from the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.  Id.  For an excellent visual of the 
DAPL route, and its proximity to the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Reservations, see Greg-
or Aisch & K.K. Rebecca Lai, The Conflicts Along 1,172 Miles of the Dakota Access Pipeline, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/23/us/dakota-access-
pipeline-protest-map.html?_r=0. 
9. Mitch Smith, Standing Rock Protest Camp, Once Home to Thousands, is Razed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/standing-rock-protest-dakota-
access-pipeline.html. 
10. Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 
F.Supp.3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01534), 2016 WL 4734356. [Hereinafter Standing Rock 
Sioux’s Complaint]. 
11. Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, almost the entirety of the DAPL requires no 
federal permitting as ninety-nine percent of its proposed route crosses privately held land. But be-
cause the DAPL crosses Lake Oahe, a federally regulated water, the Army Corps of Engineers 
must permit this crossing.  Samantha L. Varsalona, Pipelines, Protests, and General Permits, 
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://gelr.org/2016/10/28/pipelines-protests-
and-general-permits/; see also Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F.Supp.3d at 82. The Corps con-
ducts this review under § 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 408, and § 185 of 
the Mineral Leasing Act. 30 U.S.C. § 185.  See also M-Opinion at 1.   
12. Standing Rock Sioux’s Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F.Supp.3d 4 (No. 
1:16-CB-01534).  
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(RFRA)13 due to the DAPL’s potential to damage religious artifacts in Lake 
Oahe.14  They argue that an “oil spill affecting Lake Oahe would pose an 
existential threat to the Tribe’s rights, culture, and welfare, and would fun-
damentally undermine its Treaty-protected rights to the integrity of its 
homelands and the waters that sustain the Tribe.”15   
Although the court denied a preliminary injunction in September 
2016,16 the Corps recognized the need to assess the potential impact on trea-
ty rights, and stated that it would withhold an easement until the conclusion 
of this assessment.17  In December 2016, the Corps promised that it would 
prepare an environmental impact statement to address oil spill risks, tribal 
treaty rights in and around Lake Oahe, and possible alternative pipeline 
routes.18  However, after his inauguration in January 2017, one of President 
Trump’s first orders of business was to sign an executive order approving 
the DAPL Lake Oahe crossing.19  Subsequent to the executive order, and 
despite its prior assurances of a new environmental impact statement, the 
Corps determined that its prior assessments “satisfied the NEPA require-
ments for evaluating the easement required for the DAPL to cross Corps-
managed federal lands at Lake Oahe and supported a decision to grant an 
easement.”20  The Corps thus granted the easement, and in June 2017, the 
DAPL was completed.21  Soon after, the court granted in part Standing 
Rock’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that while the 
Corps “substantially complied with NEPA in many areas . . . it did not ade-
quately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing rights, hunting rights, 
or environmental justice, or the degree to which the pipeline’s effects are 
likely to be highly controversial.”22  The court ordered the Corps to “recon-
sider those sections of its environmental analysis” and requested the parties 
 
13. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 
(1993).  et seq.  
14. See generally Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 16–
1534, 2017 WL 908538 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2017) (denying Tribe’s motion for preliminary injunc-
tion).   
15. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.  
16. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 
2016 WL 4734356, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016). 
17. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.  
18. Id.  
19. Id. at 1–2. 
20. Standing Rock Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16–1534 (JEB), 2017 WL 
2573994, at *7 (D.D.C. June 14, 2017). 
21. Id.  
22. Id. at *1.  
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submit “further briefing” on whether pipeline operations can continue dur-
ing such time.23  The case continues to play out in federal court.   
But if the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (“Standing Rock Tribe”) had at-
tempted to assert its own civil jurisdictional authority over the DAPL—
either regulatory or adjudicative—what would the result have been?  If the 
DAPL produces civil claims in the future, can the Standing Rock Tribal 
Court hear them?  If left simply to the Standing Rock Tribe, there would be 
no question.  According to the Standing Rock Tribal Code of Justice, the 
Standing Rock Tribe retains civil jurisdiction over: 
 
(a) All cases in law and equity arising under the Tribal Constitu-
tion, Tribal custom and tradition, or the laws of the Tribe as set 
forth in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code of Justice or proper-
ly-adopted regulation or policy of the Tribe; and/or (b) to any case 
in which the Tribe, a member of the Tribe, and Indian residing on 
the reservation or a corporation or entity owned in whole or in 
substantial part by any Indian shall be a party.24  
  
Per its Code, the Standing Rock Tribe would have jurisdiction over the 
DAPL just by virtue of the Tribe, or a member of the Tribe, being a party.   
This Article attempts to explore whether United States federal courts 
would recognize this same jurisdictional right.25  The analysis focuses on 
two key issues, prevalent in any tribal jurisdiction claim: (1) land—i.e., 
whether the cause of action occurred in “Indian Country,”26 and (2) mem-
bership—i.e., whether one party is a non-member of the tribe.  As explored 
 
 23.  Id.  
24. Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code of Justice, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1–107.   
25. From this point forward, when this Article discusses the Tribe’s ability to assert jurisdic-
tion, it refers to jurisdiction that a federal court would recognize—bearing in mind that tribes often 
do not seek guidance from the federal judiciary in recognizing their own civil jurisdiction.   
26. “Indian Country” is shorthand for the territory upon which a tribe may assert its own 
criminal or civil jurisdiction.  The parameters of Indian Country are found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.  
See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 428 n.2 (1975) (“While § 
1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it 
generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.”).  Under § 1151, tribes may assert ju-
risdiction if the cause of action falls on (1) a reservation, (2) federal trust allotments, or (3) land 
that is part of a “dependent Indian Community.”  Id.; see also Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 
522 U.S. 520, 528 (1998).  In short, tribes lose any possibility of federal recognition of jurisdiction 
for causes of action that occur on lands outside the three categories in § 1151.  See Philip Morris 
USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]ribal jurisdic-
tion is, of course, cabined by geography: The jurisdiction of tribal courts does not extend beyond 
tribal boundaries.”) (citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 658 n. 12 (2001)).   
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more fully below, both are critical issues in determining federal recognition 
of tribal jurisdiction to regulate behavior or redress a particular civil wrong.    
Tribal legal jurisdiction is important in a number of respects.  To begin, 
there are the routine advantageous and disadvantages attendant in most fo-
rum decisions.  Assuming the court in question can meet the venue re-
quirements—e.g., personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction—the 
initial choice of forum belongs to the plaintiff.27  This decision often in-
volves weighing such things as convenience of location and the plaintiff’s 
“home-court” advantage of being in a friendly jurisdiction around like-
minded peers who may sit on a jury.28   
Yet, when it comes to tribal jurisdiction, something much deeper is at 
stake: sovereignty.  A tribe’s right to assert legal jurisdiction over that 
which affects its people or land forms a fundamental precept of sovereign-
ty.29  Here, the stakes include jurisdiction over an oil pipeline that will have 
a large impact on the people and land within Sioux territory, and a com-
modity that accounts for much of the Native American economy.30  This 
case truly represents a struggle for control over important issues with direct 
bearing on tribal land; it demonstrates the adage that tribal sovereignty 
equates to tribal identity.31  Unfortunately, over the last forty years, the 
 
27. A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 281 (4th ed. 
2014). 
28. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for A Venue: The Need for More Limits on 
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 272 (1996) (“In making the where-to-file decision, the law-
yer—normally the plaintiff’s lawyer, because the plaintiff normally is the filing party—takes 
many factors into account.”).  
29. See, e.g., Lisa M. Slepnikoff, More Questions than Answers: Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land and Cattle Company, Inc. and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Define the 
Extent of Tribal Authority over Nonmembers on Non-Indian Land, 54 S. D. L. REV. 460, 461 
(2009) (“Since the issue of tribal sovereignty was first addressed in 1832 by Chief Justice John 
Marshall, tribes have been recognized to possess the powers of inherent sovereignty over their 
land and people.”); see also Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Govern-
ment Reform: What are the Issues?, in SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS 
NATIONS: A READER 55, 55 (Robert Odawi Porter ed., 2005) (“Tribal sovereignty is dependent 
upon three things: (i) the degree to which Indians believe in the right to define their own future; 
(ii) the degree to which Indians have the power to carry out their beliefs, and (iii) the degree to 
which tribal sovereign acts are recognized both within the tribe and the outside world”).   
30. See Native American Lands and Natural Resource Development, NATURAL RESOURCE 
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (2011), http://www.resourcegovernance.org/analysis-
tools/publications/native-american-lands-and-natural-resource-development (noting “American 
Indian lands are estimated to include . . . up to 20 percent of the [United States’] known natural 
gas and oil reserves”); see also Indian Country Demographics, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS (last visited Apr. 8, 2017); see also NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN 
INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes/demographics (explaining “undeveloped reserves of 
coal, natural gas, and oil on tribal land could generate nearly $1 trillion in revenues for tribes and 
surrounding communities.”). 
31. Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75, 77 (2003) 
(“[D]ebates about tribal sovereignty quickly become debates about Indian identity.” (quoting Bar-
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United States Supreme Court has slowly eroded the scope of tribal legal ju-
risdiction.32  A shift back to greater tribal civil jurisdiction in the Twenty-
First Century will prove pivotal for tribal sovereignty.   
Part II of this Article explores the history of the Standing Rock Tribe as 
part of the Lakota People in the Dakotas, including a history of its land and 
treaty rights.  Part III parses the history of the United States’ recognition of 
tribal civil jurisdiction, and the recent approach of federal courts to curtail 
this jurisdiction.  Part IV examines two possible routes for the Standing 
Rock Tribe to achieve civil jurisdiction over the DAPL: (1) its Lake Oahe 
crossing, and (2) its crossing through lands to the north of the current 
Standing Rock Reservation, lands that the Standing Rock Tribe never actu-
ally ceded, but are now privately held.  This Article concludes by noting 
that, while the Standing Rock Tribe may find difficulty in asserting jurisdic-
tion, the federal judiciary should reverse course and allow for greater tribal 
sovereignty.  
II.  THE MODERN HISTORY AND TREATY RIGHTS OF THE 
STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE 
Before any other discussion, it is important to consider the history of 
the Standing Rock Tribe in the Dakota lands.  This section will focus, in 
particular, on events surrounding the Fort Laramie Treaties of 185133 and 
1868,34 and thereafter.  These treaties, and their aftermath, form the basis 
for the Standing Rock Tribe’s modern land claims and the potential for ju-
risdiction over the DAPL.35 
In the late 1700s, the Great Sioux Nation resided in what is present-day 
Minnesota, and began to migrate west in search of buffalo, fanning out as 
far west as Wyoming and as far south as Kansas.36  Despite these nomadic 
hunting patterns, “the core area of the Sioux Nation was not in dispute.”37  
Prior to the mid-1800s, the Great Sioux Nation’s territorial reign and eco-
nomic development remained largely uninhibited by their white neigh-
 
bara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions of Tribal Power over Chil-
dren, 83 MINN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1999)).  
32. See infra Part II. 
33. 1851 Ft. Laramie Treaty, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749 [hereinafter 11 Stat. 749]. 
34. 1868 Ft. Laramie Treaty, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter 15 Stat. 635].  
35. See supra Introduction n. 22 (discussing the tests for Indian Country); infra Part II 
(same).  
36. IMRE SUTTON, IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS’ ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 
123-24 (Imre Sutton et al. eds., 1985). 
37. Id. at 124.  
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bors.38  However, the exploding American westward expansion brought em-
igrants with accompanying population pressures and new disease.39 The 
Fort Laramie Treaties marked a transition for the Sioux’s relationship with 
European settlers and the federal government.40  The Treaties “imposed Eu-
ropean American ideas about property ownership on the landscape, and in 
the process, they introduced a new dimension into Indian-White relation-
ships that would profoundly affect the nature of tribal ties” to the Dakotas.41   
In 1851, the federal government began negotiations at Fort Laramie, 
Wyoming with a group of tribes representing the upper Missouri and Platte 
River regions.42  The eventual treaty brokered a peace between these tribes, 
and delineated a large mass of land for the Great Sioux Nation, including 
much of the Dakota Territory.43  After the 1851 Treaty, the Sioux Territory 
was bordered on the north by the Heart River (in what is now southern 
North Dakota), and on the east by the Missouri River.44  Furthermore, the 
United States agreed to “protect the [Sioux Nation] against commission of 
all depredations by the people of the said United States.”45 
The United States, however, quickly broke its promise of protection.  
From 1851 through 1867, the Lakota became “unsettled about the growing 
presence of emigrants and military commands in their shared territories.”46  
Hostilities increased between the Sioux tribes, American soldiers, and re-
gion settlers.47  To quell this conflict, the United States and the tribes met 
once again and formed the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty.48  The Treaty estab-
lished the Great Sioux Reservation, and drew its eastern boundary as the 
eastern bank of the Missouri River; its southern boundary as the northern 
border of Nebraska; its northern boundary as the “forty-sixth parallel of 
 
38. PATRICIA C. ALBERS, THE HOME OF THE BISON: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC AND 
ETHNOHISTORICAL STUDY OF TRADITIONAL CULTURAL AFFILIATIONS TO WIND CAVE 
NATIONAL PARK 88 (2003). 
39. Id.  
40. Id.  
41. Id.  
42. Id. at 89. 
43. 11 Stat. 749, art. 5.  
44. Id.  These lands include the current site of the DAPL crossing. See also Jeffery Ostler & 
Nick Estes, ‘The Supreme Law of the Land’: Standing Rock and the Dakota Access Pipeline, 
INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 16, 2017), 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/supreme-law-land-standing-rock-dakota-
access-pipeline/.  For the tribes, however, “the territorial boundaries drawn on the 1851 treaty map 
were largely meaningless as local tribes continued to move across the landscape in complex ways 
that encouraged the sharing of jointly held territories.” ALBERS, supra note 38, at 90. 
45. 11 Stat. 749, art. 3.  
46. ALBERS, supra note 38, at 96.  
47. Id. at 99. 
48. Id.  
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north latitude;” and its western boundary as “the one hundred and fourth 
meridian of west longitude, in addition to certain reservations already exist-
ing east of the Missouri.”49  The United States additionally agreed “that no 
[unauthorized] person shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or 
reside in the territory described in this article.”50  The Treaty guaranteed 
hunting rights for large swaths of lands outside the reservation boundaries.51  
And it stated that “lands north of the North Platte River and east of the 
summits of the Big Horn mountains shall be held and considered to be un-
ceded.”52  In 1978, the Indian Claims Commission found that these unceded 
northern lands stretched to the Heart River—land that the DAPL is current-
ly slated to cross.53  Finally, the Treaty stipulated, “no treaty for the cession 
of any portion or part of the reservation . . . shall be [valid] . . . unless exe-
cuted and signed by at least three-fourths of the adult male Indians occupy-
ing or interested in the same.”54      
Shortly after ratification of the 1868 Treaty, white speculators found 
gold in the Black Hills region of the Great Sioux Reservation.55  In 1874, in 
order to confirm the presence of this gold, Lieutenant Colonel George Arm-
strong Custer led a 1000 strong military brigade through the Reservation 
and into the Black Hills.56  Custer’s reports of gold, mineral, timber, and 
fertile land became widely reported back east, and ignited new pressure to 
open the Black Hills for white settlement.57  The Fort Laramie Treaty stood 
in the way.58  So, in 1875, President Grant met privately with the Secretary 
 
49. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1980); see also 15 Stat. 
635, art. 2. 
50. 15 Stat. 635, art. 2. 
51. Id. at art. 11.   
52. Id. at art. 16.  
53. Ostler & Estes, supra note 44; see also SUTTON, supra note 36, at 122 (showing map of 
“Sioux cessions and claims.”)   
54. Ostler & Estes, supra note 44.  Interestingly:  
The [1868] Fort Laramie Treaty was considered by some commentators to have been a 
complete victory for Red Cloud and the Sioux . . . it was described as the only instance in 
the history of the United States where the government has gone to war and afterwards 
negotiated a peace conceding everything demanded by the enemy and exacting nothing 
in return. 
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 371, 376 n. 4.   
55. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 376; ALBERS, supra note 38, at 120-21.  
56. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 376-77.  
57. Id. at 377.  
58. Id; see also SUTTON, supra note 36, at 125 (“As settlement pushed west in Dakota Terri-
tory, the Great Sioux Reserve stood in the path of expansion . . . .”).   
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of the Interior and the Secretary of War and declared that he would no long-
er protect the Black Hills from white intruders.59   
During the following winter of 1876, the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs notified Sioux hunting on the unceded northern lands that they must 
return to the Reservation, or they would be classified as “hostile.”60  Due to 
the severity of the winter conditions, the Sioux hunters could not comply.61  
The United States Army attacked these “hostiles,” and the ensuing war led 
to Custer’s defeat to Sitting Bull at the Battle of Little Big Horn the follow-
ing June.62  But Sitting Bull’s victory was “short-lived, and those Indians 
who surrendered to the Army were returned to the reservation, and deprived 
of their weapons and horses, leaving them completely dependent for surviv-
al on rations provided them by the Government.”63 
Congress quickly grew impatient with providing the Sioux with food 
rations, so it passed a bill ending appropriations for subsistence.64  Addi-
tionally, Congress directed the President to form a commission for retriev-
ing the Black Hills.65  In 1876, the commission arrived at the Great Sioux 
Reservation and relayed to tribal leaders that the United States had abrogat-
ed its responsibility regarding the rations.66  The parties formed a new 
agreement, in which the Sioux relinquished the Black Hills to the west and 
unceded lands to the north.67  In return, the United States would continue to 
provide rations.68  Notably, contrary to the express provision of the 1868 
Fort Laramie Treaty, only ten percent of the adult male Sioux population 
signed the 1876 Agreement.69  To that end, not only did the United States 
use coercive tactics in cementing the agreement—i.e., threatening the Sioux 
with starvation—it also violated previous treaty rights by failing to secure 
the requisite signatures.  Congress subsequently enacted the 1876 Agree-
 
59. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 378; see also ALBERS, supra note 38, at 123 (“In 
1875, the military had largely abandoned its efforts to keep prospectors and settlers out of the 
Black Hills, and even before this, they never prosecuted any of the trespassers.”). 
60. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 379.  
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, 19 Stat. 176. 
65. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 381.  
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
68. Id.; see also Ostler & Estes, supra note 44 (explaining that the 1876 Agreement purport-
ed to abrogate “the 1868 Article 16 unceded lands” to the north of the current Standing Rock Res-
ervation).   
69. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 381-82.  
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ment into law,70 formally abrogating the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty as it per-
tained to the aforementioned lands.71   
The United States Supreme Court eventually held that the 1876 agree-
ment was an unconstitutional taking and awarded the Sioux monetary com-
pensation, but not an actual return of the land.72  In so holding, the Court 
noted that “[a] more ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealings will never, 
in all probability, be found in our history.”73  The Sioux have never accept-
ed this monetary award, instead demanding “the return of the majority of 
the Black Hills lands that are under federal ownership.”74 
In 1889, during a national period of tribal land allotment,75 Congress 
passed the Act of March 2, 1889.76  This Act “removed a substantial 
amount of land from the [r]eservation and divided the remaining territory 
into several smaller reservations for various Sioux bands, including the 
Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, and Lower Brule.”77  The 1889 Act stipu-
lated, however, that provisions of the Ft. Laramie Treaty that were “not in 
conflict” remained.78  In addition, the Act delineated the “eastern border of 
the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, and Lower Brule Sioux Tribes as ‘the 
center of the main channel of the Missouri River.’”79  The United States 
 
70. Act of Feb. 28, 187, 19 Stat. 254 (1877). 
71. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 382-83. 
72. Id. at 424.  
73. Id. at 388.  
74. Ostler & Estes, supra note 44. 
75. The allotment period, beginning with the General Allotment Act of 1887—also known as 
the Dawes Act: 
Grant[ed] each [tribal] family head 160 acres of land, 80 acres to each person over 18 
years of age and to each orphan under 18, and grant[ed] all other single persons under 
eighteen 40 acres of land.  Generally, the land was held in trust for 25 years by the Unit-
ed States, with an unencumbered patent in fee issuing at the close of the trust peri-
od . . . The General Allotment Act provided that citizenship would be conferred on the 
allottees at the conclusion of the trust process.  
CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 26 (7th ed. 2015).  
 Although the general allotment period attempted to foster tribal independence over the 
land, the federal government ended up pilfering massive amounts of land from the tribes:  
Section 5 of the Act also contemplated that ‘surplus’ land, not needed for the fixed-
acreage allotment to tribal members, would be ceded to the federal government for com-
pensation through negotiations with the tribe.  Such lands were thereafter opened to non-
Indian settlement under the public lands program; thus, Indian reservations were opened 
to non-Indian settlement for the first time. 
Id.  From 1887 to 1934, the allotment era reduced tribal ownership of land from 138 million 
acres to 48 million acres—a two-thirds reduction.  Id. at 30.   
76. 25 Stat. 888.  
77. M-Opinion at 6.  
78. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 682 (1993)).  
79. Id. (citing 25 Stat. 889).  
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Supreme Court has interpreted statutory terms such as “center of the main 
channel” as referring to “the middle of the main channel of a river.”80  As a 
result, after the 1889 Act, the newly minted Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
Reservation’s eastern boarder extended to the middle of the Missouri River, 
and what would eventually become Lake Oahe.     
Lake Oahe was a direct result of the 1944 Flood Control Act,81 another 
important event in the history of the Standing Rock Tribe.  The Act created 
a flood control plan for the Missouri River by, in part, creating dams to cor-
ral seasonal flooding.82  The Act “did not authorize the acquisition of Indian 
property,” but subsequent statutes created “limited takings.”83  These stat-
utes also recognized “the Tribes’ right to ‘hunt and fish in and around on 
the aforesaid shoreline and reservoir created by the Acts, subject, however, 
to regulations governing use by other citizens of the United States.’”84  
Compensation for the land was “‘in settlement of all claims, rights,’ and 
demands of the Tribe and individual Indians associated with the Act.”85  
Moreover, the statutes took “title to any interest Indians may have in the 
bed of the Missouri River so far as it is within the boundaries of the reserva-
tion at issue.”86     
However, notwithstanding the Flood Control Act of 1944, the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation continues to extend into the middle of Lake 
Oahe.  The 1889 Act and, as explored above, relevant Supreme Court juris-
prudence establishes the eastern boundary of the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe Reservation as the middle of the Missouri River.  As the Department 
of the Interior has explained, “a significant portion of Lake Oahe remains 
within the outer boundary of the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservations.”87  This is so because the Flood Control Act of 1944, and 
 
80. Id. at 7 (citing Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1893)).  
81. Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944).  
82. M-Opinion at 6.  “These dams created huge lake-like reservoirs to control the Missouri 
River’s seasonal flooding and to end periodic devastation caused downstream.”  Id. (quoting Low-
er Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 1983)).  In a deeply sad twist of 
irony, the Flood Control Act of 1944 actually created large flooding that displaced and devastated 
many tribal families.  See Hearing on Impact of the Flood Control Act of 1944 on Indian Tribes 
along the Missouri River Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 110th 
Cong. First Session (Nov. 1, 2007) (Statement of Hon. Bryon L. Dorgan, Senator, North Dakota) 
(“The loss of these lands has been devastating to the Indian communities.  More than 900 Indian 
families were relocated, but the fact is we have had entire communities inundated by water.”).   
83. M-Opinion at 6 (quoting Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 813 
(8th Cir. 1983)).  
84. Id. (quoting 76 Stat. 701; 72 Stat. 1774; 72 Stat. 1764; 68 Stat. 1193).  
85. Id. (quoting 72 Stat. 1173; 68 Stat. 1191).  
86. Id. at 6–7 (quoting 76 Stat. 698; 72 Stat. 1762; 68 Stat. 1191).   
87. Id. at 7.  
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subsequent statutes, took land but ultimately did not reduce the size of the 
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservations.88  Conse-
quently, the Standing Rock Tribe now has possible land connections to the 
DAPL through:  (1) unceded lands to the north of the Reservation, and (2) 
Lake Oahe.  
III.  THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF TRIBAL CIVIL 
JURISDICTION 
The examination above of the Standing Rock Tribe’s history and ties to 
land can help establish the parameters of “Indian country” necessary for any 
jurisdictional claim.  But whether a tribe can ultimately assert civil jurisdic-
tion over a non-member warrants a close examination of federal caselaw.  
As explored below, since Montana v. United States,89 federal recognition of 
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members has shrunk.90 
A. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY PRE-MONTANA 
Any exploration of tribal sovereignty in post-Revolutionary War Amer-
ica must begin with the Marshall Trilogy, a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions from 1823 to 1832, which provided the cornerstone for federal Indian 
law. 91  Tribal sovereignty emerged from the Marshall Trilogy greatly di-
minished in many regards—the tribes certainly did not obtain absolute 
recognition as a nation-state—but affirmed in others: the Marshall Court’s 
explanation of tribal rights appears almost progressive next to the federal 
jurisprudence and policy that would follow.   
Tribes lost important rights under the Marshall Trilogy.  The Court re-
fused to recognize tribal ownership of territorial land in fee simple absolute, 
applying the doctrine of discovery to explain that the land now belonged to 
 
88. See id. (“[C]ourts have recognized that the Flood Control Act takings statutes did not 
diminish their associated reservations.”).  
89. Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).  
90. See Lisa M. Slepnikoff, supra note 29, at 460 (noting that the Marshall Trilogy recog-
nized tribal power “of inherent sovereignty over their territory and people,” but since the late 
1970s, “the U.S. Supreme Court began to depart from traditional notions of tribal sovereignty”); 
Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 643 (2003) (“Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has led a 
massive assault on tribal sovereignty.  Although it has acted to affirm expansive powers over trib-
al members, it has substantially curtailed tribal power over nonmembers . . . .”). 
91. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  
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the federal government.92  Moreover, the Court held, under Article III of the 
Constitution, that tribes lacked any standing in federal court.93  But perhaps 
the most indelible restriction on sovereignty came from the Court labeling 
tribes as domestic dependent nations within the greater federal framework, 
rather than independent nation-states within the United States’ geographic 
boundary.94  The Court famously explained that tribes “[were] in a state of 
pupilage” with “[t]heir relations to the Unites States resemble[ing] that of a 
ward to his guardian.”95  This guardian-ward summation necessarily led to a 
precipitous imbalance in the tribal/federal power dynamic.96     
The Marshall Trilogy, however, also established some important tribal 
rights.  First, the Court held that, although tribes did not own their lands in 
fee simple, they retained the rights of occupancy and exclusion.97  And 
while tribal sovereignty existed within the larger federal framework, the 
Court found that tribes retained the sovereign right of self-governance over 
their territory—an inherent right that pre-dated the formation of the United 
States.98  The Marshall Court cemented a lasting principal that tribes retain 
these inherent powers, as long as the two sides did not terminate the power 
through an agreement.99  The tribes also gained assured federal protection 
against encroachment by state governments into tribal sovereignty or terri-
tory.100     
 
92. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574 (“[Tribal] power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principal, that discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it.”).  
93. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.  
94. Id. at 17.   
95. Id.  
96. Id.  
97. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574 (1823) (explaining that tribes are “the rightful occupants of 
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their 
own discretion . . . .”).  This right of exclusivity, however, was ultimately limited by federal con-
trol over the underlying land.   
98. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (“A weak state, in order to provide 
for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself 
of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.”). 
99. See id. at 556-57 (noting that prior congressional acts “manifestly consider the several 
Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their 
authority is exclusive . . . .”); Braveman, supra note 31, at 83 (showing that the Marshall Court 
“provided the foundation” for the principle “that the ‘powers of Indian tribes are, in general, in-
herent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’”) (quoting United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978)).  
100. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, 
occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the cit-
izens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in con-
formity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.”).   
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After the Marshall Court, the next wave of groundbreaking cases came 
under the more conservative Court of the late Nineteenth Century.  This era 
ushered the “rise of federal plenary power” over tribal affairs, significantly 
expanding federal control. 101  In United States v. Kagama, 102 for example, 
the Court examined congressional power to establish duel federal-tribal ju-
risdiction over “major” crimes committed in Indian Country.103  The Court 
determined that, while the Constitution contained no provision granting 
Congress this authority, Congress derived the necessary authority from its 
role as guardian.104  Aside from expanding the powers of the federal gov-
ernment, however, the Court largely left intact tribal legal jurisdiction over 
their territories—assuming, of course, Congress did not intervene.105   
Seventeen years later, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court expanded 
congressional power further by finding that Congress held the unilateral 
right to abrogate past treaties, if in the best interest of the United States.106  
The Court explained that “[p]lenary authority over tribal relations of the In-
dians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power 
has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the 
judicial department of the government.”107  The concept of congressional 
plenary power over tribal affairs persists today.108   
With the Twentieth Century came multiple important federal policy 
shifts.  First, the Allotment Era,109 which had spanned the late Nineteenth 
through early Twentieth Century, ended in 1934 with the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act.110  The Indian Reorganization Act “reversed the allotment poli-
cy and sought to revitalize tribal government rather than destroying it.”111  
However, in the 1940s, the federal government reversed course again and 
 
101. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 75, at 86.   
 102.  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
103. Id. at 379.  
104. Id. at 382.  
105. See id. at 381-82 (“[Tribes] were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-
independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as states, not as nations, not as 
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulat-
ing their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of 
the State within whose limits they resided.”). 
106. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). 
107. Id. at 565.  
108. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 194 (2004) (explaining that “the Constitu-
tion, through the Indian Commerce and Treaty Clauses, grants Congress plenary and exclusive 
powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes”) (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands and 
Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979)). 
109. See supra Part I n. 75 (exploring the Dawes Act).   
110. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).  
111. Singer, supra note 90, at 649-50.  
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began a policy of terminating federal recognition of tribes, thereby sever-
ing—in many instances at least—the inter-governmental relationship be-
tween the federal government and federally recognized tribes.112  This poli-
cy proved brief and unsuccessful and, since 1960, the federal government 
has officially “supported tribal sovereignty and affirmed the government-to-
government relationship existing between federally recognized tribes and 
the United States.”113         
 During this period of transition, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. 
Lee. 114  Lee featured a debt recovery claim in Arizona state court against 
members of the Navajo Nation, brought by a non-tribal member who oper-
ated a business on the Navajo Reservation.  The Court held that the Navajo 
Nation, rather than Arizona, had jurisdiction by stating:   
 
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over 
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the 
Indians to govern themselves.  It is immaterial that respondent is 
not an Indian.  He was on the Reservation and the transaction with 
the Indian took place there.115   
 
The Court “reinforced the post-1934 Congressional policy of leaving the 
governance of Indian country with Indian tribes, even when non-Indians 
were involved.”116    
However, only twenty years later, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 
signaled a new era of Supreme Court hesitancy in allowing tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-members.117  Oliphant questioned the Suquamish Tribe’s 
criminal jurisdiction over acts committed by non-Indians on tribal land.118  
The Court eventually held that the Suquamish Tribe lacked jurisdiction, 
even if the crime occurred on tribal land.119  Tribes, “by submitting to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States,” lost the “power to try non-
 
112. Id. at 650. 
113. Id.  
114. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).   
115. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).   
116. Robert N. Clinton, There is no Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 113, 209 (2002).  
117. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).  
118. Id. at 194. 
119. Id. at 209. 
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Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Con-
gress.”120  
Without explicitly stating, Oliphant reflected the Court’s general dis-
trust of tribal courts.  To reach its conclusion, Oliphant looked to Ex parte 
Crow Dog—an 1883 case regarding federal criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
members on tribal land—for the potential injustice in allowing tribal courts 
to try non-Indians.121  It quoted Crow Dog for the proposition that tribal 
courts try non-Indians “not by their peers, nor by the customs of their peo-
ple, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a different race, according to the 
law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception.”122  That 
Oliphant used this excerpt to justify restrictions on tribal jurisdiction is 
shocking enough, but it gets worse.  The Court omitted language from the 
full quote that would have demonstrated its true discriminatory basis.  Here 
is the quote in full, in which Crow Dog examines problems with federal 
criminal jurisdiction over tribal members:   
 
It tries them not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, 
nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race, ac-
cording to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect 
conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, 
to the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their sav-
age nature; one which measures the red man’s revenge by the 
maxims of the white man’s morality.123 
 
Therefore, in relying on Crow Dog, the Oliphant opinion relays that 
“just as it is unfair to subject ‘savages separated by race and tradition’ to the 
law of the United States, it is unfair to subject non-Indians to the laws of 
‘savage Indians.’”124  Oliphant’s fundamental distrust of tribal courts, and 
the historic racism predicating this distrust, influenced Montana just two 
years later, and continues to reverberate today.125   
 
120. Id. at 210. 
121. Id.   
122. Id. at 210-11.  
123. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883) (emphasis added).  
124. Braveman, supra note 31, at 107.  
125. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“While modern tribal courts include 
many familiar features of the judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs, lan-
guages, and usages of the tribes they serve.  Tribal courts are often subordinate to the political 
branches of tribal governments, and their legal methods may depend on unspoken practices and 
norms . . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marking omitted), holding superseded by 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2); Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 181 (5th Cir. 
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B. MONTANA AND ITS EFFECT ON TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION 
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Montana v. United States,126 now 
regarded as “the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over 
nonmembers.”127  Montana examined the Crow Tribe of Montana’s regula-
tion of non-member hunting and fishing within the Reservation.128  At the 
onset, the Court explained that the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and 
fishing of non-members “on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the 
United States in trust for the Tribe.”129  The remaining issue was whether 
the Crow Tribe could regulate non-member hunting and fishing on the pri-
vate fee simple land within the Reservation.130 
In determining the extent of the Crow Tribe’s ability to regulate hunt-
ing and fishing by non-members on reservation fee land, the Court relied on 
Oliphant—and, as explored above, its racist underpinnings—for the “gen-
eral proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian Tribe do 
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”131  The Court, 
however, formulated two exceptions to this general rule.  First, tribes retain 
the power to regulate non-members who engage in a “consensual relation-
ship[] with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements.”132  Second, tribes retain the power to regu-
late non-member behavior “on fee lands within its reservation when that 
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”133  Either of these 
exceptions will afford tribal jurisdiction.  Here, the Court found that hunting 
and fishing failed under both exceptions.134  The hunters did not enter a 
consensual relationship with the Crow Tribe, and a lack of control over 
 
2014) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“There is no reason [defendant] should have reasonably anticipated 
that . . . it would be subject to the entire—and largely undefined—body of Indian tribal tort law.”); 
Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 800 (2007) (explain-
ing the tension between “Indian nations’ inherent right to live and govern beyond the reach of the 
dominant society” and those that feel “imposing liberalism onto Indian nations is necessary to 
prevent intrusions on individual rights by tribal governments.”).  
126. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).  
127. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).  
128. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557.  
129. Id. (quoting United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1165-1166 (9th Cir. 1979) rev’d 
sub nom. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)). 
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 565. 
132. Id.  
133. Id. at 566.  
134. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566  
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hunting and fishing would not “threaten the Tribe’s political or economic 
security as to justify regulation.”135  
Montana left several questions in its wake.  While some of the ques-
tions have been answered definitively, others linger.  As addressed below, 
these have included:  (1) whether the extent of tribal civil adjudicative ju-
risdiction parallels the civil regulatory authority that Montana addressed; 
(2) the scope of Montana’s second exception; and (3) the significance of 
land—i.e., whether Montana applies to non-member conduct on tribally 
owned land. 
1. Civil Regulatory versus Adjudicative Jurisdiction 
After Montana, some speculated that its holding applied merely to civil 
regulatory jurisdiction, rather than civil adjudicative jurisdiction.136  Civil 
adjudicative jurisdiction concerns the ability to redress civil claims against 
individual defendants.137  Whereas, civil regulatory authority138 concerns 
the ability to regulate conduct within a geographic location—land use regu-
lation or taxing authority, for example.139  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, how-
ever, laid this speculation to rest.140  
In Strate, the Supreme Court considered tribal civil jurisdiction over a 
negligence claim resulting from a car accident on a North Dakota state 
highway in the Fort Berthold Reservation.141  The Court found that, alt-
hough located in the Reservation, the state highway was the “equivalent, for 
nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land.”142  And 
while Strate addressed the Tribe’s civil adjudicative jurisdiction over a tort 
claim, as opposed to civil regulatory jurisdiction, the Court still applied 
Montana.143  It determined that “[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudica-
tive jurisdiction does not exceed it legislative jurisdiction.”144  Accordingly, 
 
135. Id.  
136. See Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal Court Ju-
risdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1, 27 (1996) (“The ruling in Montana related 
to legislative jurisdiction not adjudicative jurisdiction.”).  
137. Id. at 28. 
138. Civil regulatory jurisdiction is commonly known as “legislative jurisdiction.”  
139. Singer, supra note 136, at 27-28. 
140. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).   
141. Id. at 442.  
142. Id. at 454.   
143. Id. at 453.  
144. Id.  
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Montana controls for non-member conduct on fee land within a reservation, 
whether the jurisdictional question is regulatory or adjudicative.145  
2. Interpretation of Montana’s Second Exception 
Unlike the more open and shut question of civil adjudicative versus 
regulatory jurisdiction, application of Montana’s second exception146 has 
been a continuing source of inconsistency and confusion within the federal 
judiciary.  Strate is illustrative of where the Supreme Court has taken Mon-
tana’s second exception.  In applying the first Montana exception, Strate 
quickly dismissed the car accident as a nonconsensual act.147  The Court 
then provided an extremely narrow interpretation of Montana’s second ex-
ception.  As explored, Montana’s original second exception language ad-
dressed potential infringement upon the “political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”148  If the non-member’s ac-
tion met this criterion, the tribe could assert civil jurisdiction.149  On its face, 
“political integrity, economic security, or the health and welfare of the 
tribe” might encompass many behaviors—including a tribe’s ability to ad-
dress negligent driving.150  Nevertheless, Strate explained that the second 
exception isn’t nearly so broad.151  This exception only comes into play 
when the non-member’s action threatens the tribe’s ability “to protect tribal 
self-government” or control “internal relations.”152  In other words, Mon-
tana didn’t really mean what it said.  
In the end, the Court found that negligent driving failed to meet Mon-
tana’s second exception because “[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory au-
thority over the state highway accident is needed to preserve the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”153  It 
reasoned that “those who drive carelessly on a public highway running 
through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the 
 
        145. See id. at 459. 
146. This Article explores Montana’s second exception, as it is most germane to the Stand-
ing Rock Tribe’s potential for jurisdiction over the DAPL—the Standing Rock Tribe would have a 
hard time arguing with a straight face that it entered into a consensual relationship with Dakota 
Access, LLC.  However, rest assured that Montana’s first exception has produced no shortage of 
litigation.  See, e.g., Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 176 (5th 
Cir. 2014).   
147. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457.  
148. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544, 566.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459. 
 151. Id.  
152. Id. (quoting Montana). 
153. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).   
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safety of tribal members . . . [b]ut if Montana’s second exception requires 
no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.”154  In reality, by in-
terpreting Montana so narrowly, the Court signals that the second exception 
exists only on paper.  In fact, the Court has explained in subsequent juris-
prudence that the action “must do more than injure the tribe, it must imperil 
the subsistence of the tribal community.”155  Thus, at this point, a non-
member action that threatens tribal self-governance may not even suffice.    
This narrowness was on full display in Atkinson Trading Company, 
Inc. v. Shirley.156  Shirley evaluated the Navajo Nation’s ability to tax a 
non-member owned hotel located on fee land within the Navajo Reserva-
tion.157  The Court held that the Navajo lacked jurisdiction because the loss 
of the Nation’s ability to tax this one hotel would not threaten “or [have] 
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health and welfare of the tribe.”158  Montana, the Court explained, gives 
“nothing beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations.”159  The Court further stated, “[w]hatever effect 
the petitioner’s operation of the [hotel] might have on surrounding Navajo 
land, it [did] not endanger the Navajo Nation’s political integrity.”160  
Shirley stands in stark contrast to the Court’s prior holding in Merrion 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, a case that dealt with the Jicarilla Apache Tribe’s 
power to tax non-member oil operations on its New Mexico Reservation.161  
In affirming the Jicarilla Apache Tribe’s right to issue this tax, the Court 
noted: 
 
The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty be-
cause it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territo-
rial management.  This power enables a tribal government to raise 
revenues for its essential services.  The power does not derive 
solely from the Indian tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from 
tribal lands.  Instead, it derives from the Tribe’s general authority, 
as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, 
 
154. Id. at 457-58.  
155. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).  
156. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).  
157. Id. at 649.  
158. Id. at 656.  
159. Id. at 658. 
160. Id.  
161. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).  
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and to defray the cost providing governmental services by requir-
ing contributions from persons within its jurisdiction.162   
  
Notably, Merrion did not apply Montana—probably because the tax 
took place on tribally owned land, rather than privately owned fee land.  In-
deed, the difference in land was Shirley’s justification for declining to apply 
Merrion to a tax on businesses located on reservation fee land.163   
But this difference in land does not explain why Shirley declined to ap-
ply Merrion once it reached Montana’s second exception.  Merrion clearly 
states that the power to tax is essential to tribal self-government.164  If the 
“political integrity, economic security, and health and welfare” that Mon-
tana references really boils down to tribal self-government, nothing is more 
essential to self-government then the power to tax.  Yet Shirley’s analysis 
was so narrow that, even though the true right at stake was a broad power to 
tax non-member business on reservation fee lands, the Court examined the 
mere effect of not being able to tax the petitioner’s one business.165  This 
analytical singularity, however, could apply to any strand of governmental 
sovereignty. 
For instance, the Internal Revenue Service’s power to tax is clearly es-
sential to the United States’ ability to self-govern—in terms of both gener-
ating revenue and structuring societal behavior.166  Under Shirley’s mode of 
analysis, a single taxpayer could argue that the IRS’s essential function is 
not so essential as it pertains just to them.  And if you accumulate all of the 
individual taxpayers who could make this same argument, eventually the 
government completely loses its ability to tax.  By contrast, Merrion ana-
lyzed tribal ability to tax, not as it pertained to one plaintiff, but rather as it 
pertained to anyone within the Tribe’s territory.  Shirley should have done 
the same, and is now representative of just how high the Montana bar has 
been set.  Because if the power to tax is not enough to meet Montana’s se-
cond exception, it is hard to fathom that anything would be.    
Lower federal circuit courts, however, are not always perfect in taking 
the Supreme Court’s lead.  Even though the Supreme Court has been ex-
plicit in narrowing Montana’s second exception, federal circuit courts have 
been inconsistent in their approach.  Some circuit courts continue to apply 
 
162. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).  
163. Shirley, 532 U.S. at 653-54. 
164. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 136.  
165. See Shirley, 532 U.S. at 656-59.  
166. JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 2-8 (16th ed. 2012).  
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the second exception broadly, while others track the High Court and apply 
it narrowly—this discrepancy sometimes even occurs within the same cir-
cuit.167  The result lends to uncertainty in how a federal court might apply 
Montana in addressing tribal jurisdiction over the effects of an oil pipeline. 
3. The Importance of Land 
As explored above, Montana examined tribal jurisdiction over non-
member conduct on fee land within a reservation, and articulated a general 
presumption against such jurisdiction, absent two exceptions.168  But Mon-
tana additionally explained that had the hunting and fishing in question oc-
curred “on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust 
for the Tribe” the Tribe would have retained jurisdiction.169  As a result, 
immediately after Montana, tribes would have safely assumed, at the very 
least, that they retained the sovereignty to address non-member conduct on 
tribal land.  
Nevada v. Hicks upended this assumption.170  The petitioner in Hicks 
was a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, and resided on its Res-
ervation in Nevada.171  The petitioner sued a Nevada state game warden in 
tribal court, alleging that the warden had illegally searched his residence.172  
In assessing the tribal court’s jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that while the cause of action occurred on tribally owned land—
as opposed to private fee land—land status was not dispositive of whether 
 
167. Compare Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 817 
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding land lease dispute between tribe and non-member corporation met Mon-
tana’s second exception because the business venture “constituted a significant economic interest 
for the tribe”), and Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mis-
sissippi in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding private non-member corporation’s 
tortious actions and “seiz[ure] of sensitive information” within tribal casino met Montana’s se-
cond exception by “menac[ing] the political integrity, the economic security, and the health and 
welfare of the tribe to such a degree that it imperiled the subsistence of the tribal community.” 
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341)), with Fort Yates 
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., 278 F.3d 663, 665-66, 669-70 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that tribe lacked jurisdiction because allegation of breach of public school’s “duty to pro-
vide safe learning environment” and negligent hiring practices did not “imperil the subsistence of 
the Tribe”), and Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 736 F.3d 1298 1306 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (holding tribe lacked jurisdiction over construction project that would allegedly cause 
groundwater contamination because the project did not “pose[] catastrophic risks”), and MacAr-
thur v. San Juan Cty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1075 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that tribal “interest in reg-
ulating employment relationships between its members and non-Indian employers on the reserva-
tion” did not meet Montana’s second exception).  
168. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.  
169. Id. at 557. 
170. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).  
171. Id. at 355-56.  
172. Id. at 356-57.  
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Montana applied.173  In a marked departure from past caselaw, the Court 
found that “[t]he ownership status of land . . . is only one factor to consider 
when determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is 
‘necessary to protected tribal self-government or to control internal rela-
tions.’”174  Moreover, “the existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough 
to support regulatory jurisdiction over non-members.”175  The Court applied 
Montana and held that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in execut-
ing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not es-
sential to tribal self-government.”176   
Still, Hicks left more questions than answers.  To start, the case had ad-
dressed a narrow circumstance: namely, tribal jurisdiction over non-
members on tribal land when there is an important competing state interest.  
Hicks clearly held that Montana applies in this specific instance.  And Hicks 
stated explicitly that its holding extended only to the facts in front of the 
Court.177  The Court stated, “[o]ur holding in this case is limited to the ques-
tion of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We 
leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defend-
ants in general.”178  Both Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg’s concurring 
opinions echoed this exact sentiment.179   
The Court, however, has also provided some clues that Hicks may have 
broader implications.  For example, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
proclaimed that the Court “finally resolv[ed] that Montana . . . governs a 
tribe’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers regardless of land ownership.”180  
Stronger yet, dicta in Plains Commerce Bank—a case featuring a non-
member action on reservation fee land—explained that Montana “restricts 
tribal authority over nonmember activities taking place on the reservation, 
and is particularly strong when the nonmembers activity occurs on land 
owned in fee simple by non-Indians—what we have called ‘non-Indian fee 
land.’”181  
Regardless of the language in Plains Commerce Bank, federal circuit 
courts are split regarding the significance of land ownership.  The Ninth 
Circuit has interpreted Hicks as applying only to instances where there is a 
 
173. Id. at 359-60. 
174. Id. at 360. 
175. Id.   
176. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.  
 177.  Id. at 558. 
178. Id. at 404 n.2.  
179. Id. at 376 (Souter, J., concurring); Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).   
180. Id. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
181. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008).  
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competing state interest, and limits Montana to non-member actions occur-
ring off of tribal land.182  Conversely, other circuits now apply Montana to 
all actions involving non-members, whether or not it occurs on non-tribal 
land.183  Some courts do not even bother to examine where the action took 
place and automatically apply Montana if it involves a non-member.184  
Hence, the prevailing trend seems to be moving farther and farther away 
from Williams v. Lee and the traditional notion that there is “no doubt” re-
garding tribal jurisdiction over non-member action on tribal land.185 
IV. PATHS FOR TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DAPL 
 Two potential options have been proposed for the Standing Rock Tribal 
Court to gain jurisdiction—either regulatory or adjudicative—over the 
DAPL.  First, the pipeline crosses through lands north of the current Reser-
vation186 expressly reserved by the Standing Rock Tribe under the 1868 Ft. 
Laramie Treaty.187  And although these lands were taken by an 1876 
“agreement,” the Supreme Court subsequently declared this an unconstitu-
tional taking and awarded compensation that the Tribe has flatly rejected.188  
Accordingly, the Standing Rock Tribe may argue that the pipeline runs 
through Sioux territory, thereby providing civil jurisdiction.   
Second, the DAPL will cross underneath Lake Oahe, and a substantial 
portion of Lake Oahe falls within the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reserva-
tion.189  The pipeline passes a half-mile north of the Reservation boundary, 
and does not physically cross through the Reservation portion of the lake.  
But a pipeline crossing underneath a lake located partially on a reservation 
 
182. See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 
2011) (“Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as the principal that only Congress 
may limit a Tribe’s sovereign authority, suggest that Hicks is best understood as the narrow deci-
sion it claims to be . . . Its application of Montana to a jurisdictional question arising on tribal land 
should apply only when the specific concerns at issue in that case exist.  Because none of those 
circumstances exist here, we must follow precedent that limits Montana to cases arising on non-
Indian land.”)  
183. See Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians, 807 F.3d 184, 207 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “Montana applies regardless of wheth-
er the actions take place on fee or non-fee land”).  
184. See, e.g., Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015); Dolgencorp, 
Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).  
185. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
186. See supra Part I.  
187. See supra Part I.  
188.  United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 371 (1980); Ostler & Estes, su-
pra note 44. 
189. See supra Part I.  
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might lead to tribal jurisdiction over any negative future effects.  Both ar-
guments will be explored in turn.  
A. LANDS TO THE NORTH 
The Standing Rock Tribe may have an uphill battle if it attempts to 
gain jurisdiction by arguing that the pipeline passes through unceded lands 
to the north of the Reservation.  This land seems like it meets the definition 
of Indian Country, as the Standing Rock Tribe never formally ceded it.  The 
1876 Agreement was gained through duress and failed to carry the requisite 
number of signatures, as mandated for any land cession under the 1868 Ft. 
Laramie Treaty.190  Furthermore, the Standing Rock Tribe has never ac-
cepted court-awarded compensation for this taking.191  In a sane and just 
world, this land is Standing Rock Sioux Territory—albeit now owned in 
fee.  Alas, federal Indian law is often not sane or just.  
 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court explored a class claim 
by the Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Tribes arguing that the United States 
had taken their land illegally by a fraudulent agreement that lacked the re-
quired number of signatures.192  The Tribes contended that the subsequent 
federal statute immortalizing the agreement was therefore void.193  The 
Court ultimately determined that Congress had plenary authority over tribal 
affairs,194 which included the unilateral power to abrogate treaties “in the 
interest of the country.”195  In 1986, the Supreme Court re-visited congres-
sional power to abrogate treaties and determined that Congress has this abil-
ity as long as its “intentions” are “clear and plain.”196 
The federal taking of lands to the north of the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe Reservation was evil, but it was also a clear congressional abrogation 
of past treaty rights.  Under federal law, Congress had this plenary authori-
ty.197  That the 1876 Agreement failed to carry the correct number of signa-
tures, that it was cemented through coercive tactics, and that it lacked any 
semblance of fair consideration was enough for the Supreme Court to deem 
the agreement an unconstitutional taking.198  Merely holding that the 
 
190. See supra Part III.B.1.  
191. See supra Part III.B.1. 
192. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).  
193. Id. at 563-64.  
194. See id. at 565 (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exer-
cised by Congress from the beginning . . . .”).  
195. Id. at 566.  
196. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).  
197. Id.  
198. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371(1980).  
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agreement was an illegal taking, however, did not translate into a return of 
the land, or the land morphing back to tribal territory.  The Tribe’s rejection 
of monetary compensation does not change this equation.   
B. LAKE OAHE 
A second potential route for tribal jurisdiction over the DAPL could 
come from the pipeline’s crossing through Lake Oahe, a half-mile upstream 
from the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation.  An analysis of this route 
will need to differentiate between an attempt for civil regulatory jurisdiction 
versus an attempt for civil adjudicative jurisdiction for suits against the Da-
kota Access, LLC199 individually for monetary damage in the event of an 
oil spill.  
The civil regulatory course would be nearly impossible.  First, the pipe-
line route does not cross through Standing Rock territory—it passes just to 
the north.200  The Standing Rock Tribe would have difficulty gaining regu-
latory authority over activity that occurs outside of its territory.201  Second, 
even if the Standing Rock Tribe could show that the pipeline runs through 
actual reservation territory, it would face the additional roadblock of federal 
preemption; the ability to grant permits for pipelines to cross federally regu-
lated waters—such as Lake Oahe—falls within the sole province of the 
Army Corps of Engineers.202 
The more realistic road to tribal jurisdiction would come through civil 
adjudicative jurisdiction.  Although the pipeline will not cross through the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation, it will cross underneath a lake 
partly on reservation territory, and any resulting problems with the pipe-
line—an oil spill, for example—could have disastrous consequences for its 
 
199. If the Standing Rock Tribe attempted to sue the Army Corps of Engineers in tribal 
court, it would face the obstacle of sovereign immunity.  See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 2005 EDITION 649 (2005) (“The general principle immunizing the United States 
from suit without [its] consent extends to suits filed by Indian nations against the United States in 
tribal courts . . . .”).   
200. See supra Introduction.  
201. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 938 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (explaining that tribal jurisdiction is limited to Indian country) (citing Atkinson Trading 
Co., 532 U.S. at 658 n. 12).  
202. See supra note 11.  However, the Standing Rock Tribe may be able to side-step federal 
preemption by arguing that: “(1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely in-
tramural matters; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by 
Indian treaties; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress in-
tended the law not to apply to Indians on their reservations.”  Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal 
Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal brackets and quotation omitted).  Here, the 
Standing Rock Tribe may have a legitimate argument under abrogation of treaty rights.  But, as 
the pipeline does not pass through tribal territory, this argument is largely academic.  
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land and water.  The Standing Rock Tribe may have a chance of asserting 
jurisdiction if anything goes wrong, depending on whether, and how, a fed-
eral court applies Montana.  
South Dakota v. Bourland is a good place to start in answering this 
question.203  Bourland looked at the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s regula-
tion of hunting and fishing by non-members on land and water still located 
within Reservation boundaries.204  However, the federal government had 
acquired this land and water for construction of the Oahe Dam.205  This case 
resembled Montana in that the Cheyenne River Tribe was attempting to 
regulate non-member hunting and fishing on land within the reservation, 
but no longer owned by the Cheyenne River Tribe.206  The Court found that 
a tribe’s ability to regulate stems from its power to exclude.207  In this case, 
Congress had eliminated the Cheyenne River Tribe’s power to exclude by 
taking the land for the Oahe Dam Project “and broadly opening up those 
lands for public use,”208 thereby ending “the Tribe’s pre-existing regulatory 
control over non-Indian hunting and fishing.”209  The Court noted, however, 
that the loss of the right to exclude created just a presumption that the 
Cheyenne River Tribe had lost regulatory control, and it remanded the case 
for application of Montana’s exceptions.210   
The Bourland holding applies to the Standing Rock Tribe’s jurisdiction 
over the portion of Lake Oahe that falls on reservation territory.  Much like 
the section of the Missouri River that the Cheyenne River Tribe attempted 
the regulate in Bourland, the Lake Oahe section of the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe Reservation was taken by Congress for the Oahe Dam project.211  
And, even though Bourland dealt with civil regulatory jurisdiction, its hold-
ing applies to civil adjudicative jurisdiction because tribal adjudicative au-
thority does not exceed regulatory authority.212  Therefore, under Bourland, 
a court would likely apply Montana to the Standing Rock Tribe’s civil ad-
 
203. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).  
 204.  Id. at 681-82. 
205. Id.  
206. Id. at 688.  
207. Id. at 689.  
208. Id.  
209. Bourland. 508 U.S. at 695.  
210. Id. at 695-98.  On remand, the Eight Circuit found that tribal ability to regulate hunting 
and fishing did not meet either Montana exception.  See generally South Dakota v. Bourland, 39 
F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994).  
211. M-Opinion at 8-9.  
212. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.  
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judicative jurisdiction over the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation wa-
ters of Lake Oahe.     
How a court might apply Montana to the Standing Rock Tribe’s civil 
adjudicative authority over the DAPL is unpredictable, and ultimately de-
pends on the proclivities of the specific federal circuit, or even individual 
judges within that circuit.213  An oil pipeline is obviously a different matter 
than hunting and fishing, both in terms of its potential for environmental ca-
lamity, and the ability of the Standing Rock Tribe to address the effects of 
an important natural resource.  However, under the Supreme Court’s in-
creasingly restrictive application of Montana, the effects of an oil pipeline 
may not be enough.  If the Court found that the ability to levy taxes was not 
essential to tribal self-government,214 it remains doubtful that an oil pipeline 
would.  Unless the Standing Rock Tribe received a federal circuit court’s 
more liberal reading of Montana’s second exception, its claim for jurisdic-
tion would likely fail.  This, in and of itself, is enough to signal that Mon-
tana’s second exception really is no exception at all.  Montana has become 
window dressing for the growing assumption within federal courts that 
tribes cannot assert jurisdiction over non-members, period. 
The potential source of trouble that would occur off-reservation pro-
vides another wrinkle.  If there were an oil spill, the spill itself would have 
originated off of tribal territory, and thus normally would be off limits en-
tirely for tribal jurisdiction.215  In this instance though, the effects of the 
spill would potentially occur on the reservation itself, leaving the Standing 
Rock Tribe with a strong argument that it could apply its jurisdictional au-
thority.216  This is especially so if the potential oil spill affected the reserva-
tion land.  Most of the reservation land had not been taken for the Oahe 
Dam; therefore, the Standing Rock Tribe retains the right to exclude, and, 
theoretically, the inherent right to assert jurisdiction over the conduct of 
members and non-members alike.  This right would include jurisdiction 
over the disastrous effects of an oil spill on Reservation land.  As noted 
above, however, in the wake of Hicks, the growing trend for federal courts 
is to apply Montana regardless of land status.217  Even if the particular ac-
tion took place on tribal land, this claim would involve a non-member.  A 
 
213. See supra Part II.B.  
214. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc., 532 U.S. at 658.  
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216. See Wisconsin v. E.P.A., 266 F.3d 741, 749 (7th Cir. 2001) (“There is no case that ex-
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217. See supra Part II.B.3.  
          
86 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1 
court might just apply Montana, and the chances of success would become 
more difficult.      
V. CONCLUSION 
The Standing Rock Tribe’s best hope of asserting jurisdiction over the 
DAPL would come through civil adjudicative jurisdiction over any result-
ing negative effects.  Federal courts have increasingly applied Montana if a 
case involves a non-member, regardless of the status of the land, and have 
increasingly narrowed Montana’s second exception to the point of nullity.  
As such, any claim for tribal jurisdiction over the effects of the DAPL may 
be met with Montana, and may ultimately wither under Montana’s extreme-
ly steep test.  The DAPL, therefore, provides a great demonstration of how 
federal courts apply Montana in too many situations, and how its test has 
become too onerous.  If a tribe cannot assert jurisdiction over the territorial 
effects of a nearby pipeline, merely because the pipeline is owned and oper-
ated by a non-member, what non-member activity would suffice?  The fed-
eral judiciary should rewind back to a time when it recognized greater tribal 
civil jurisdictional sovereignty.     
